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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 6638

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: YO, CH
SUBJ: OBSERVATIONS ON CHAIRMAN HUA'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

REF: BELGRADE 6450 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. CHAIRMAN HUA'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS FOR BOTH SIDES, A TRIUMPH FOR TITO, A DIPLOMATIC COUP FOR HUA, AND A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S POLICIES OF NONALIGNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW. STATE AND PARTY RELATIONS WERE FULLY NORMALIZED AND BOTH SIDES, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF
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MUTUAL RESPECT, COOPERATION, AND EQUALITY, COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO INCREASED COORDINATION, COOPERATION, EXCHANGES, AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE NOW OPEN BUT CAN BE EASILY OVERESTIMATED: THE BENEFITS TO YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE HUA VISIT ARE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL. TO WHAT DEGREE MILITARY SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN TITO AND HUA IS NOT KNOWN,

BUT OUR EASTERN EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES IN BELGRADE APPEAR CERTAIN THEY WERE.

2. THE YUGOSLAV WELCOME TO HUA WAS NOT WITHOUT SOME COST TO BELGRADE. AT A TIME WHEN YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE ALREADY TROUBLED, YUGOSLAV LEADERS CAREFULLY CALCULATED THE POLITICAL RISKS AND THEN DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE HUA VISIT, SEEKING AT THE SAME TIME TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AS ELUSIVE A RHETORICAL TARGET AS POSSIBLE AND STRESSING THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS. ON THE FORMER, THEY MET WITH SOME SUCCESS, SINCE MOSCOW WAS REDUCED TO CRITICIZING THE YUGOSLAV PRESS AND THE OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED TO HUA TO MAKE ANTI-SOVIET REMARKS. AS FOR ASSUAGING SOVIET CONCERNS AND IRRITATION, THE RETURNS ARE NOT ALL IN, BUT IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THE HUA VISIT HAS QUICKENED THE PACE OF THE STEADY EROSION OF YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH WE HAVE OBSERVED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE VISIT: HUA'S EIGHTH DAY VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS--A PERSONAL TRIUMPH FOR TITO, A DIPLOMATIC COUP FOR HUA, A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S NON-ALIGNED POLICIES AND INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW, AND A VINDICATION, ONCE AGAIN, OF YUGOSLAVIA'S ONCE CONDEMNED SEPARATE ROAD TO SOCIALISM. CAREFULLY PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT WITH NO EVIDENT SNAFUS, SURPRISES, OR VERBAL BLUNDERS, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE VISIT WAS MARKED THROUGHOUT BY GENUINE WARMTH AND MUTUAL RESPECT. THE CHINESE WERE EAGER, DELIGHTED, RESPECTFUL GUESTS; THE YUGOSLAVS WERE MILDLY INTRIGUED, CONFIDENT, CAREFUL HOSTS. BOTH SEEMED TO RELISH THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY AND THE SENSE OF SOMETHING HISTORIC HAPPENING; AND BOTH EMPHASIZED, IN CONTRAST TO THE ROMANIANS, THE INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS BILATERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VISIT. IN OVER THIRTEEN HOURS OF FORMAL TALKS AND EIGHT HOURS OF SOCIALIZING, THE PERSONAL CHEMISTRY BETWEEN HUA AND TITO, FIRST ESTABLISHED DURING TITO'S VISIT TO PEKING LAST AUGUST, WAS STRENGTHENED. BEFITTING THE LEADER OF A COUNTRY WHICH EARLIER HAD BRANDED TITO A "DWARF IN THE MUD," HUA WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO BE DEFERENTIAL, TO STRESS TITO'S "IMMENSE" WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND TO PRAISE YUGOSLAVIA'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE YUGOSLAVS, OF COURSE, WERE NOT LOATHE TO ACCEPT THE COMPLIMENTS.

4. YUGOSLAV-CHINESE RELATIONS: ONWARD AND UPWARD. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE "NEGATIVE LEGACY" OF THE PAST, AS HUA AND TITO TERMED IT, WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND OVERCOME, AND A

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NEW STAGE OF RELATIONS ATTAINED. BOTH SIDES, IN THE
COURSE OF THEIR EXHAUSTIVE EXCHANGES, FOUND BROAD AREAS OF
AGREEMENT AND ASSERTED THAT REMAINING DIFFERENCES POSED NO
OBSTACLE TO DEEPENED YUGOSLAV-CHINESE RELATIONS. PARTY
RELATIONS WERE FULLY NORMALIZED, THE FIRST STEP IN THIS
PROCESS BEING THE WARM CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE SENT BY THE
CHINESE TO THE YUGOSLAV 11TH PARTY CONGRESS IN JUNE.

5. STATE RELATIONS WERE LIKEWISE PUT ON A SOLID, FRIENDLY,
LONG TERM FOOTING, WITH COMMITMENTS ON BOTH SIDES TO EXTEND
COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION (ON THE UN, NAM, AND DETENTE,
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AMONG OTHERS), EXPAND PRESENT EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, AND DEEPEN THEIR PURSUIT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. MOST IMPORTANT, AT LEAST IN YUGOSLAV EYES, THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE YUGOSLAV-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP IS BASED WERE CLEARLY DEFINED (INDEPENDENCE, EQUALITY, MUTUAL RESPECT, NON-INTERFERENCE) AND A DRAMATIC, INSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLE PROVIDED (FOR THE SOVIETS) OF THE TYPE OF COOPERATIVE, EQUAL, SOCIALIST RELATIONS THAT TITO HAS BEEN FIGHTING FOR DURING THE PAST THIRTY YEARS.

6. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, BOTH SIDES ARE COMMITTED TO EXPAND TRADE, INFORMATION EXCHANGED, AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, BUT IT REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION JUST HOW FAR THIS PROCESS CAN GO, IN VIEW OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISTANCE, MARKET SIZE, PRICE COMPETITIVENESS, AND TRADABILITY OF GOODS. BOTH SIDES ASSERT THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE TO BE BASED ON ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND MUTUAL ADVANTAGE RATHER THAN POLITICS. NEVERTHELESS, THE WILL IS THERE; AN EXCEPTIONALLY FAVORABLE POLITICAL BACKDROP EXISTS; AND THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE OPEN.

7. REGARDING MILITARY MATTERS, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS DISCUSSED, LET ALONE AGREED UPON. EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS, HOWEVER, SEEM CONVINCED THAT MILITARY ISSUES AND POSSIBLE COOPERATION OF SOME SORT WERE, IN FACT, DISCUSSED. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE HEARD THAT ASPECTS OF YUGOSLAVIA'S SELF-DEFENSE SYSTEM WERE DISCUSSED, THAT THE CHINESE APPROVINGLY INSPECTED CAMOUFLAGED STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS IN THE ZMAJ AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY COMPLEX, THAT MILITARY OFFICERS WERE ATTACHED TO THE DELEGATION (THOUGH THEY WERE NOT LISTED AS MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION), AND THAT HUA HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YUGOSLAV MILITARY LEADERS (NAVAL COMMANDER MAMULA FOR SURE, DURING AUGUST 26 CRUISE ABOARD THE "GALEB," BUT PROBABLY OTHERS

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AS WELL). ON THE OTHER HAND, A LEADING SERBIAN OFFICIAL (SERBIAN PRESIDENT VIDIC) WHO MET WITH HUA AND WHO SEEMS WELL INFORMED, TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT ONE COULD REJECT RUMORS OF A YUGOSLAV-CHINESE MILITARY ARRANGEMENT, NOTING THAT "THE YUGOSLAVS WILL NEVER DO ANYTHING WHICH COULD HARM SOVIET INTERESTS."

8. SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS: ANOTHER BLACK MARK IN MOSCOW'S BOOK. YUGOSLAVIA CAN ILL AFFORD TO INDULGE ITSELF BY GRATUITOUSLY IRRITATING MOSCOW, PARTICULARLY WITH THE POST-TITO EAR (AND UNCERTAINTIES) APPROACHING. NOR IS IT PREPARED TO SERVE AS A CHINESE PAWN IN THE NAM OR IN A BALANCE OF POWER GAME IN EASTERN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER CAREFULLY WEIGHING THE RISKS, CONCLUDING THAT NOW WAS AS GOOD (OR BAD) A TIME AS ANY, AND BELIEVING THAT

SOVIET IRE WOULD BE SHORT LIVED, THE YUGOSLAVS WENT AHEAD WITH THE HUA VISIT, TAKING CARE TO AVOID CONTENTIOUS TERMS LIKE HEGEMONISM, MINIMIZE OCCASIONS FOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, STRESS THE CONSISTENT AND PRINCIPLED NATURE OF YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY, AND ASSURE MOSCOW THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THIRD PARTIES.

9. YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR, IN SHORT, WAS A MODEL OF DECORUM, AND ALL THE MORE FRUSTRATING FOR MOSCOW, WHICH WAS REDUCED TO CRITICIZING THE YUGOSLAV PRESS AND THE OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED HUA TO MAKE ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS, BECUASE IT PROVIDED AN ELUSIVE TARGET FOR DIRECT CRITICISM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE YUGOSLAVS QUIETLY--AND THEREFORE ALL THE MORE EFFECTIVELY--GOT ACROSS THEIR POINTS: DETERMINATION TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT COURSE (BY PROCEEDING WITH THE VISIT IN THE FIRST PLACE), TO DEFEND YUGOSLAV TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY (HUA'S VISIT TO MACEDONIA), AND TO PROMOTE THE YUGOSLAV VISION OF EQUAL, COOPERATIVE COMMUNIST RELATIONS (THE EMPHASIS ON MUTUAL RESPECT, EQUALITY, AND INDEPENDENCE).

10. THE CHINESE, FOR THEIR PART AND PRESUMABLY AT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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URGING OF THE YUGOSLAVS, BEHAVED WITH RELATIVE RESTRAINT.

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THE REFERENCES TO "HEGEMONISM" IN HUA'S OPENING AND CLOSING TOASTS AND IN HIS FAREWELL TELEGRAM WERE FAIRLY TAME BY CHINESE STANDARDS (AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE FROM BELGRADE) AND DID NOT GO MUCH BEYOND YUGOSLAV STATEMENTS AT THE LCY CONGRESS OR NAM MINISTERIAL. LIKEWISE, THE VISIT TO MACEDONIA WAS A SYMBOLIC, CALCULATED STATEMENT, NOT LIKELY TO SIT WELL WITH MOSCOW OR SOFIA. BUT HUA CAGILY UNDERPLAYED IT, AVOIDED MENTION OF THE MACEDONIAN NATIONALITY DISPUTE, AND MERELY NOTED THE GLORIOUS PAST OF THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE. HE COULD HARDLY HAVE DONE LESS.

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11. WE ARE NOT IN THE BEST POSITION TO JUDGE HOW DEEPLY SOVIET IRRITATION RUNS, WHAT ACTIONS MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO TAKE, OR WHAT LESSONS IT WILL DRAW FROM THE HUA VISIT. BUT THE PRAVDA AND TASS CRITICISM, THE POSTPONEMENT OF CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER SOLOMENTSEV'S VISIT ON SHORT NOTICE, ECHOES OF THE SOVIET LINE IN THE CZECH, BULGARIAN, AND POLISH PRESS, AND THE ABRUPT CANCELLATION OF TWO UNANNOUNCED VISITS BY THE POLISH CHIEF OF MILITARY LOGISTICS AND THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATION DIVISION HEAD (WHICH A POLISH DIPLOMAT EXPLICITLY LINKED TO THE HUA VISIT), SEEM INDICATIVE OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE MOVING.

12. IN SHORT, WHEN ADDED TO YUGOSLAV CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE POST-TITO ERA, SOVIET-BACKED COMINFORMIST ACTIVITY IN YUGOSLAVIA (THE DAPCEVIC AND PEROVIC EPISODES), ANTICIPATED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH TIES WITH ALBANIA, POLEMICS WITH BULGARIA OVER THE MACEDONIAN NATIONALITY QUESTION, PRONOUNCED SOVIET COOLNESS TO THE LCY 11TH PARTY CONGRESS, DIFFERENCES OVER NAM ORIENTATION, AND YUGOSLAV INSISTENCE ON GOING ITS OWN WAY, THE HUA VISIT IS CERTAIN TO ROIL THE ALREADY TROUBLED WATERS OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. (A SEPARATE AND MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE STEADY EROSION OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WHICH

WE HAVE OBSERVED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IS TO FOLLOW.)
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